Effective guide for behaviour of farmers in the withdrawal of rural homesteads: An evolutionary game-based study

• Published in: Mathematical biosciences and engineering : MBE Vol. 19; no. 8; pp. 7805 - 7825
• Main Authors: Liu, Jingyu, Meng, Weidong, Li, Yuyu, Huang, Bo, Zhang, Bixi
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: AIMS Press 01.01.2022
• Subjects: allocation of land resource elements; construction land; dynamic mechanism; evolutionary game; idle homesteads; penalty mechanism
• ISSN: 1551-0018; 1551-0018
• DOI: 10.3934/mbe.2022365

In this study, we determined how farmers can be effectively encouraged to withdraw from their idle homesteads, in addition to revitalising the rural construction land stock and realising the market-oriented allocation of land resources. We constructed an evolutionary game model under three scenarios: without penalty mechanism; with a static penalty mechanism; and with a dynamic penalty mechanism. Further, we explicitly describe the strategic behaviours and dynamic evolution processes of local governments and farmers during withdrawal from their rural homesteads. According to the results of the evolutionary stable strategy, under effect of the dynamic penalty mechanism, the strategy systems formed by local governments as well as farmers can gradually converge and stabilise after short-term shocks, compared with that under the no penalty and static penalty mechanisms. Overall, the penalty mechanism mitigates the instability in the game process during participants' incremental changes and strategy choices, while the dynamic mechanism is optimal. Both static and dynamic penalty mechanisms influence the binary equilibrium strategies of local governments as well as farmers, and farmers' strategies evolve towards this state of withdrawal from their homesteads with increasing penalty. When the model is dynamically improved, the probability of farmers' withdrawal of their homesteads increases with increasing penalty. Thus, clearly, the establishment of a penalty mechanism can promote stability of the participants' system; higher penalty implies higher motivation for farmers to withdraw their idle homesteads, enabling revitalisation of the rural stock of construction land and promotion of the optimal allocation of land resource elements.