Dynamic Routing for Social Information Sharing

• Published in: IEEE journal on selected areas in communications Vol. 35; no. 3; pp. 571 - 585
• Main Authors: Yunpeng Li, Courcoubetis, Costas A., Lingjie Duan
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: New York IEEE 01.03.2017; The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
• Subjects: Atomic properties; Computer networks; content-restriction; Cost accounting; Cost analysis; Cultural differences; Game theory; Information management; Information sharing; Low cost; mechanism design; Mobile communication; Mobile computing; mobile crowdsensing; Mobile social networks; price of anarchy; Routing; Routing (telecommunications); routing game; side payments; Social network services; Social networks; Traffic information; Wireless networks
• DOI: 10.1109/JSAC.2017.2659578
• ISSN: 0733-8716

Today, mobile users are intensively interconnected thanks to the emerging mobile social networks, where they share location-based information with each other when traveling on different routes and visit different areas of the city. In our model, the information collected is aggregated over all users' trips and made publicly available as a public good. Due to information overlap, the total useful content amount increases with the diversity in path choices made by the users, and it is crucial to motivate selfish users to choose different paths, despite the potentially higher costs associated with their trips. In this paper, we combine the benefits from social information sharing with the fundamental routing problem where a unit mass of non-atomic selfish users decides their trips in a non-cooperative game by choosing between a high-cost and a low-cost path. To remedy the inefficient low-content equilibrium where all users choose to explore a single path (the low-cost path), we propose and analyze two new incentive mechanisms that can be used by the social network application, one based on side payments and the other on restricting access to content for users that choose the low cost path. Under asymmetric information about user types (their valuations for content quality), both mechanisms efficiently penalize the participants that use the low-cost path and reward the participants that take the high-cost path. They lead to greater path diversity and hence to more total available content at the social cost of reduced user participation or restricted content to part of the users. We show that user heterogeneity can have opposite effects on social efficiency depending on the mechanism used. We also obtain interesting price of anarchy results that show some fundamental tradeoffs between achieving path diversity and maintaining greater user participation, motivating a combined mechanism to further increase the social welfare. Our model extends classical dynamic routing in the case of externalities caused from traffic on different paths of the network.