Multiplayer Pursuit-Evasion Differential Games With Malicious Pursuers

• Published in: IEEE transactions on automatic control Vol. 67; no. 9; pp. 4939 - 4946
• Main Authors: Xu, Yuhang, Yang, Hao, Jiang, Bin, Polycarpou, Marios M.
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: New York IEEE 01.09.2022; The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
• Subjects: <named-content xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:ali="http://www.niso.org/schemas/ali/1.0/" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" content-type="math" xlink:type="simple"> <inline-formula> <tex-math notation="LaTeX"> N</tex-math> </inline-formula> </named-content>-player nonzero-sum game; Differential equations; Differential games; Fault-tolerant control; Game theory; Games; Linear matrix inequalities; malicious agents; Nash equilibrium; Performance analysis; Performance indices; pursuit-evasion differential games; Pursuit-evasion games; Social networking (online); Technological innovation
• ISSN: 0018-9286; 1558-2523
• DOI: 10.1109/TAC.2022.3168430

This article investigates the multiplayer pursuit-evasion (MPE) differential games in the presence of malicious pursuers. First, three types of malicious pursuers, namely greedy , lazy , and traitorous pursuers are formulated by using two subjectively malicious factors in the performance index. Then, an N -player nonzero-sum game framework is established to study the relationships among healthy pursuers, malicious pursuers, and evaders. The capturability and Nash equilibrium of such a new MPE differential game are rigorously analyzed. Finally, the effects of malicious pursuers on the capture time are explicitly quantified by the minimal pursuit coefficient , whose explicit form is obtained by the solutions from coupled Riccati differential equations.