Multiple Pursuer Multiple Evader Differential Games

In this article an <inline-formula><tex-math notation="LaTeX">N</tex-math></inline-formula>-pursuer versus <inline-formula><tex-math notation="LaTeX">M</tex-math></inline-formula>-evader team conflict is studied. This article extend...

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Published inIEEE transactions on automatic control Vol. 66; no. 5; pp. 2345 - 2350
Main Authors Garcia, Eloy, Casbeer, David W., Von Moll, Alexander, Pachter, Meir
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published New York IEEE 01.05.2021
The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
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Abstract In this article an <inline-formula><tex-math notation="LaTeX">N</tex-math></inline-formula>-pursuer versus <inline-formula><tex-math notation="LaTeX">M</tex-math></inline-formula>-evader team conflict is studied. This article extends classical differential game theory to simultaneously address weapon assignments and multiplayer pursuit-evasion scenarios. Saddle-point strategies that provide guaranteed performance for each team regardless of the actual strategies implemented by the opponent are devised. The players' optimal strategies require the codesign of cooperative optimal assignments and optimal guidance laws. A representative measure of performance is employed and the Value function of the attendant game is obtained. It is shown that the Value function is continuously differentiable and that it satisfies the Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equation-the curse of dimensionality is overcome and the optimal strategies are obtained. The cases of <inline-formula><tex-math notation="LaTeX">N=M</tex-math></inline-formula> and <inline-formula><tex-math notation="LaTeX">N>M</tex-math></inline-formula> are considered. In the latter case, cooperative guidance strategies are also developed in order for the pursuers to exploit their numerical advantage. This article provides a foundation to formally analyze complex and high-dimensional conflicts between teams of <inline-formula><tex-math notation="LaTeX">N</tex-math></inline-formula> pursuers and <inline-formula><tex-math notation="LaTeX">M</tex-math></inline-formula> evaders by means of differential game theory.
AbstractList In this article an <inline-formula><tex-math notation="LaTeX">N</tex-math></inline-formula>-pursuer versus <inline-formula><tex-math notation="LaTeX">M</tex-math></inline-formula>-evader team conflict is studied. This article extends classical differential game theory to simultaneously address weapon assignments and multiplayer pursuit-evasion scenarios. Saddle-point strategies that provide guaranteed performance for each team regardless of the actual strategies implemented by the opponent are devised. The players' optimal strategies require the codesign of cooperative optimal assignments and optimal guidance laws. A representative measure of performance is employed and the Value function of the attendant game is obtained. It is shown that the Value function is continuously differentiable and that it satisfies the Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equation-the curse of dimensionality is overcome and the optimal strategies are obtained. The cases of <inline-formula><tex-math notation="LaTeX">N=M</tex-math></inline-formula> and <inline-formula><tex-math notation="LaTeX">N>M</tex-math></inline-formula> are considered. In the latter case, cooperative guidance strategies are also developed in order for the pursuers to exploit their numerical advantage. This article provides a foundation to formally analyze complex and high-dimensional conflicts between teams of <inline-formula><tex-math notation="LaTeX">N</tex-math></inline-formula> pursuers and <inline-formula><tex-math notation="LaTeX">M</tex-math></inline-formula> evaders by means of differential game theory.
In this article an [Formula Omitted]-pursuer versus [Formula Omitted]-evader team conflict is studied. This article extends classical differential game theory to simultaneously address weapon assignments and multiplayer pursuit-evasion scenarios. Saddle-point strategies that provide guaranteed performance for each team regardless of the actual strategies implemented by the opponent are devised. The players’ optimal strategies require the codesign of cooperative optimal assignments and optimal guidance laws. A representative measure of performance is employed and the Value function of the attendant game is obtained. It is shown that the Value function is continuously differentiable and that it satisfies the Hamilton–Jacobi–Isaacs equation—the curse of dimensionality is overcome and the optimal strategies are obtained. The cases of [Formula Omitted] and [Formula Omitted] are considered. In the latter case, cooperative guidance strategies are also developed in order for the pursuers to exploit their numerical advantage. This article provides a foundation to formally analyze complex and high-dimensional conflicts between teams of [Formula Omitted] pursuers and [Formula Omitted] evaders by means of differential game theory.
Author Garcia, Eloy
Casbeer, David W.
Pachter, Meir
Von Moll, Alexander
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  givenname: Eloy
  orcidid: 0000-0002-7749-418X
  surname: Garcia
  fullname: Garcia, Eloy
  email: eloygarcia@alumni.nd.edu
  organization: Control Science Center of Excellence, Air Force Research Laboratory, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio, USA
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  givenname: David W.
  orcidid: 0000-0002-7065-7337
  surname: Casbeer
  fullname: Casbeer, David W.
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  organization: Control Science Center of Excellence, Air Force Research Laboratory, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio, USA
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  givenname: Alexander
  orcidid: 0000-0002-7661-5752
  surname: Von Moll
  fullname: Von Moll, Alexander
  email: alexander.von_moll@us.af.mil
  organization: Control Science Center of Excellence, Air Force Research Laboratory, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio, USA
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  givenname: Meir
  orcidid: 0000-0003-0584-6913
  surname: Pachter
  fullname: Pachter, Meir
  email: meir.pachter@afit.edu
  organization: Department of Electrical Engineering, Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio, USA
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Snippet In this article an <inline-formula><tex-math notation="LaTeX">N</tex-math></inline-formula>-pursuer versus <inline-formula><tex-math...
In this article an [Formula Omitted]-pursuer versus [Formula Omitted]-evader team conflict is studied. This article extends classical differential game theory...
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SubjectTerms Aerospace electronics
Autonomous systems
Co-design
Differential games
Game theory
Games
Government
intelligent control
optimal control
Pursuit-evasion games
Saddle points
State feedback
Switches
Teams
Weapons
Title Multiple Pursuer Multiple Evader Differential Games
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