Do constitutional courts restrict government policy? The effects of budgetary implications and bloc-politics in the Hungarian Constitutional Court's decisions between 1990 and 2018

The article addresses the budgetary implications of constitutional adjudication by analysing the decisions of the Hungarian Constitutional Court (HCC) between 1990 and 2018. Our results highlight that the HCC does not narrow the parliamentary majority's room to manoeuvre by blocking policies wi...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published inEast European politics Vol. 39; no. 3; pp. 391 - 413
Main Authors Pócza, Kálmán, Papp, Zsófia, Dobos, Gábor, Gyulai, Attila
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Abingdon Routledge 03.07.2023
Taylor & Francis Ltd
Subjects
Adjudication
Blocking
Constitutional courts
Constitutional government
Constitutional law
Decisions
Hungarian constitutional court
judicial behaviour
Left wing politics
Legislatures
national budget
policy-making
Political majority
Public policy
Online AccessGet full text

Cover

More Information
Summary:The article addresses the budgetary implications of constitutional adjudication by analysing the decisions of the Hungarian Constitutional Court (HCC) between 1990 and 2018. Our results highlight that the HCC does not narrow the parliamentary majority's room to manoeuvre by blocking policies with serious budgetary consequences, and the potential budgetary consequences of a decision do not weigh in with the judicial output. At the same time, right-leaning courts are more likely to declare a law unconstitutional passed by a left-wing parliamentary majority, whereas left-wing courts adjudicate unconstitutionality with about roughly the same likelihood in cases of right- and left-leaning parliaments.
ISSN:2159-9165
2159-9173
DOI:10.1080/21599165.2022.2126834