Descartes on the logical properties of ideas

• Published in: British journal for the history of philosophy Vol. 14; no. 3; pp. 401 - 411
• Main Author: Bailey, D. T. J.
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Abingdon Routledge 01.08.2006; Taylor & Francis
• Subjects: 17th century; Historical studies (History of philosophy. History of ideas); Philosophy; Century 17; Philosophy history; Logics; Idea; Descartes (R.); Property
• ISSN: 0960-8788; 1469-3526
• DOI: 10.1080/09608780600792083

There is a problem in Descartes' writings about the logical nature of the contents of his understanding, his ideas. On the one hand it seems that such things can be true, for Descartes argues in Meditation III that any idea he clearly and distinctly perceives is bound to be true. However, in the same Meditation, he seems to say something incompatible with this: that "ideas considered in themselves, and not referred to something else, cannot strictly speaking be false". Suggests that Descartes' reason for denying falsehood of ideas in themselves was caused, although he may not have realised it, by a difficulty about what ideas can be perceived by the mind in what way, and how this fits with the theory of error in Meditation IV. Descartes might have been lured unwittingly towards a denial of falsity to ideas in themselves. (Quotes from original text)