Implementation via Information Design in Binary‐Action Supermodular Games

What outcomes can be implemented by the choice of an information structure in binary‐action supermodular games? An outcome is partially implementable if it satisfies obedience (Bergemann and Morris (2016)). We characterize when an outcome is smallest equilibrium implementable (induced by the smalles...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inEconometrica Vol. 92; no. 3; pp. 775 - 813
Main Authors Morris, Stephen, Oyama, Daisuke, Takahashi, Satoru
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published 01.05.2024
Subjects
Information design
potential game
sequential obedience
smallest equilibrium implementation
supermodular game
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