Phenomenal transparency and the transparency of subjecthood

• Published in: Analysis (Oxford) Vol. 81; no. 1; pp. 39 - 45
• Main Author: Morris, Kevin
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: 01.01.2021
• ISSN: 0003-2638; 1467-8284
• DOI: 10.1093/analys/anaa047

According to phenomenal transparency, phenomenal concepts are transparent where a transparent concept is one that reveals the nature of that to which it refers. What is the connection between phenomenal transparency and our concept of a subject of experience? This paper focuses on a recent argument, due to Philip Goff, for thinking that phenomenal transparency entails transparency about subjecthood. The argument is premissed on the idea that subjecthood is related to specific phenomenal properties as a determinable of more specific determinates. I argue that the argument fails, which opens the door for one to endorse phenomenal transparency while denying transparency about the concept of a subject of experience. I draw out the consequences of this for certain versions of the combination problem for panpsychist metaphysics and moreover argue that rejecting the transparency of subjecthood does not undermine anti-physicalist arguments premissed on considerations relating to phenomenal transparency .