Genomic investigation to identify the source of SARS-CoV-2 infection among healthcare personnel

Background: Contact tracing alone is often inadequate to determine the source of healthcare personnel (HCP) COVID-19 when SARS-CoV-2 is widespread in the community. We combined whole-genome sequencing (WGS) with traditional epidemiologic analysis to investigate the frequency with which patients or o...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published inAntimicrobial stewardship & healthcare epidemiology : ASHE Vol. 2; no. S1; pp. s74 - s75
Main Authors Sansom, Sarah, Barbian, Hannah, Snitkin, Evan, Fukuda, Christine, Moore, Nicholas, Thotapalli, Lahari, Baied, Elias, Kim, DO Young, Hayden, Mary, Lin, Michael
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Cambridge Cambridge University Press 01.07.2022
Subjects
Online AccessGet full text

Cover

Loading…
Abstract Background: Contact tracing alone is often inadequate to determine the source of healthcare personnel (HCP) COVID-19 when SARS-CoV-2 is widespread in the community. We combined whole-genome sequencing (WGS) with traditional epidemiologic analysis to investigate the frequency with which patients or other HCP with symptomatic COVID-19 acted as the source of HCP infection at a large tertiary-care center early in the pandemic. Methods: Cohort samples were selected from patients and HCP with PCR-positive SARS-CoV-2 infection from a period with complete retention of samples (March 14, 2021–April 10, 2020) at Rush University Medical Center, a 664-bed hospital in Chicago, Illinois. During this period, testing was limited to symptomatic patients and HCP. Recommended respiratory equipment for HCP evolved under guidance, including a 19-day period when medical face masks were recommended for COVID-19 care except for aerosol-generating procedures. Viral RNA was extracted and sequenced (NovaSeq, Illumina) from remnant nasopharyngeal swab samples in M4RT viral transport medium. Genomes with >90% coverage underwent cluster detection using a 2 single-nucleotide variant genetic distance cutoff. Genomic clusters were independently evaluated for valid epidemiologic links by 2 infectious diseases physicians (with a third adjudicator) using metadata extracted from the electronic medical record and according to predetermined criteria (Table 1). Results: In total, 1,031 SARS-CoV-2 sequences were analyzed, identifying 49 genomic clusters with HCP (median, 8; range, 2–43 members per cluster; total, 268 patients and 115 HCP) (Fig. 1). Also, 20,190 flowsheet activities were documented for cohort HCP and patient interactions, including 686 instances in which a cohort HCP contributed to a cohort patient’s chart. Most HCP infections were considered not healthcare associated (88 of 115, 76.5%). We did not identify any strong linkages for patient-to-HCP transmission. Moreover, 13 HCP cases (11.3%) were attributed to patient source (weak linkage). Also, 14 HCP cases (12.2%) were attributed to HCP source (11 strong and 3 weak linkages). Weak linkages were due to lack of epidemiologic data for HCP location, particularly nonclinical staff (eg, an environmental service worker who lacked location documentation to rule out patient-specific contact). Agreement for epidemiologic linkage between the 2 evaluators was high (κ, 0.91). Conclusions: Using genomic and epidemiologic data, we found that most HCP COVID-19 infections were not healthcare associated. We found weak evidence to support symptomatic patient-to-HCP transmission of SARS-CoV-2 and stronger evidence for HCP-to-HCP transmission. Large genomic clusters without plausible epidemiologic links were identified, reflecting the limited utility of genomic surveillance alone to characterize chains of transmission of SARS-CoV-2 during extensive community spread. Funding: None Disclosures: None
AbstractList Background: Contact tracing alone is often inadequate to determine the source of healthcare personnel (HCP) COVID-19 when SARS-CoV-2 is widespread in the community. We combined whole-genome sequencing (WGS) with traditional epidemiologic analysis to investigate the frequency with which patients or other HCP with symptomatic COVID-19 acted as the source of HCP infection at a large tertiary-care center early in the pandemic. Methods: Cohort samples were selected from patients and HCP with PCR-positive SARS-CoV-2 infection from a period with complete retention of samples (March 14, 2021–April 10, 2020) at Rush University Medical Center, a 664-bed hospital in Chicago, Illinois. During this period, testing was limited to symptomatic patients and HCP. Recommended respiratory equipment for HCP evolved under guidance, including a 19-day period when medical face masks were recommended for COVID-19 care except for aerosol-generating procedures. Viral RNA was extracted and sequenced (NovaSeq, Illumina) from remnant nasopharyngeal swab samples in M4RT viral transport medium. Genomes with >90% coverage underwent cluster detection using a 2 single-nucleotide variant genetic distance cutoff. Genomic clusters were independently evaluated for valid epidemiologic links by 2 infectious diseases physicians (with a third adjudicator) using metadata extracted from the electronic medical record and according to predetermined criteria (Table 1 ). Results: In total, 1,031 SARS-CoV-2 sequences were analyzed, identifying 49 genomic clusters with HCP (median, 8; range, 2–43 members per cluster; total, 268 patients and 115 HCP) (Fig. 1 ). Also, 20,190 flowsheet activities were documented for cohort HCP and patient interactions, including 686 instances in which a cohort HCP contributed to a cohort patient’s chart. Most HCP infections were considered not healthcare associated (88 of 115, 76.5%). We did not identify any strong linkages for patient-to-HCP transmission. Moreover, 13 HCP cases (11.3%) were attributed to patient source (weak linkage). Also, 14 HCP cases (12.2%) were attributed to HCP source (11 strong and 3 weak linkages). Weak linkages were due to lack of epidemiologic data for HCP location, particularly nonclinical staff (eg, an environmental service worker who lacked location documentation to rule out patient-specific contact). Agreement for epidemiologic linkage between the 2 evaluators was high (κ, 0.91). Conclusions: Using genomic and epidemiologic data, we found that most HCP COVID-19 infections were not healthcare associated. We found weak evidence to support symptomatic patient-to-HCP transmission of SARS-CoV-2 and stronger evidence for HCP-to-HCP transmission. Large genomic clusters without plausible epidemiologic links were identified, reflecting the limited utility of genomic surveillance alone to characterize chains of transmission of SARS-CoV-2 during extensive community spread. Funding: None Disclosures: None
Background: Contact tracing alone is often inadequate to determine the source of healthcare personnel (HCP) COVID-19 when SARS-CoV-2 is widespread in the community. We combined whole-genome sequencing (WGS) with traditional epidemiologic analysis to investigate the frequency with which patients or other HCP with symptomatic COVID-19 acted as the source of HCP infection at a large tertiary-care center early in the pandemic. Methods: Cohort samples were selected from patients and HCP with PCR-positive SARS-CoV-2 infection from a period with complete retention of samples (March 14, 2021–April 10, 2020) at Rush University Medical Center, a 664-bed hospital in Chicago, Illinois. During this period, testing was limited to symptomatic patients and HCP. Recommended respiratory equipment for HCP evolved under guidance, including a 19-day period when medical face masks were recommended for COVID-19 care except for aerosol-generating procedures. Viral RNA was extracted and sequenced (NovaSeq, Illumina) from remnant nasopharyngeal swab samples in M4RT viral transport medium. Genomes with >90% coverage underwent cluster detection using a 2 single-nucleotide variant genetic distance cutoff. Genomic clusters were independently evaluated for valid epidemiologic links by 2 infectious diseases physicians (with a third adjudicator) using metadata extracted from the electronic medical record and according to predetermined criteria (Table 1). Results: In total, 1,031 SARS-CoV-2 sequences were analyzed, identifying 49 genomic clusters with HCP (median, 8; range, 2–43 members per cluster; total, 268 patients and 115 HCP) (Fig. 1). Also, 20,190 flowsheet activities were documented for cohort HCP and patient interactions, including 686 instances in which a cohort HCP contributed to a cohort patient’s chart. Most HCP infections were considered not healthcare associated (88 of 115, 76.5%). We did not identify any strong linkages for patient-to-HCP transmission. Moreover, 13 HCP cases (11.3%) were attributed to patient source (weak linkage). Also, 14 HCP cases (12.2%) were attributed to HCP source (11 strong and 3 weak linkages). Weak linkages were due to lack of epidemiologic data for HCP location, particularly nonclinical staff (eg, an environmental service worker who lacked location documentation to rule out patient-specific contact). Agreement for epidemiologic linkage between the 2 evaluators was high (κ, 0.91). Conclusions: Using genomic and epidemiologic data, we found that most HCP COVID-19 infections were not healthcare associated. We found weak evidence to support symptomatic patient-to-HCP transmission of SARS-CoV-2 and stronger evidence for HCP-to-HCP transmission. Large genomic clusters without plausible epidemiologic links were identified, reflecting the limited utility of genomic surveillance alone to characterize chains of transmission of SARS-CoV-2 during extensive community spread.Funding: NoneDisclosures: None
Background: Contact tracing alone is often inadequate to determine the source of healthcare personnel (HCP) COVID-19 when SARS-CoV-2 is widespread in the community. We combined whole-genome sequencing (WGS) with traditional epidemiologic analysis to investigate the frequency with which patients or other HCP with symptomatic COVID-19 acted as the source of HCP infection at a large tertiary-care center early in the pandemic. Methods: Cohort samples were selected from patients and HCP with PCR-positive SARS-CoV-2 infection from a period with complete retention of samples (March 14, 2021–April 10, 2020) at Rush University Medical Center, a 664-bed hospital in Chicago, Illinois. During this period, testing was limited to symptomatic patients and HCP. Recommended respiratory equipment for HCP evolved under guidance, including a 19-day period when medical face masks were recommended for COVID-19 care except for aerosol-generating procedures. Viral RNA was extracted and sequenced (NovaSeq, Illumina) from remnant nasopharyngeal swab samples in M4RT viral transport medium. Genomes with >90% coverage underwent cluster detection using a 2 single-nucleotide variant genetic distance cutoff. Genomic clusters were independently evaluated for valid epidemiologic links by 2 infectious diseases physicians (with a third adjudicator) using metadata extracted from the electronic medical record and according to predetermined criteria (Table 1). Results: In total, 1,031 SARS-CoV-2 sequences were analyzed, identifying 49 genomic clusters with HCP (median, 8; range, 2–43 members per cluster; total, 268 patients and 115 HCP) (Fig. 1). Also, 20,190 flowsheet activities were documented for cohort HCP and patient interactions, including 686 instances in which a cohort HCP contributed to a cohort patient’s chart. Most HCP infections were considered not healthcare associated (88 of 115, 76.5%). We did not identify any strong linkages for patient-to-HCP transmission. Moreover, 13 HCP cases (11.3%) were attributed to patient source (weak linkage). Also, 14 HCP cases (12.2%) were attributed to HCP source (11 strong and 3 weak linkages). Weak linkages were due to lack of epidemiologic data for HCP location, particularly nonclinical staff (eg, an environmental service worker who lacked location documentation to rule out patient-specific contact). Agreement for epidemiologic linkage between the 2 evaluators was high (κ, 0.91). Conclusions: Using genomic and epidemiologic data, we found that most HCP COVID-19 infections were not healthcare associated. We found weak evidence to support symptomatic patient-to-HCP transmission of SARS-CoV-2 and stronger evidence for HCP-to-HCP transmission. Large genomic clusters without plausible epidemiologic links were identified, reflecting the limited utility of genomic surveillance alone to characterize chains of transmission of SARS-CoV-2 during extensive community spread.
Background: Contact tracing alone is often inadequate to determine the source of healthcare personnel (HCP) COVID-19 when SARS-CoV-2 is widespread in the community. We combined whole-genome sequencing (WGS) with traditional epidemiologic analysis to investigate the frequency with which patients or other HCP with symptomatic COVID-19 acted as the source of HCP infection at a large tertiary-care center early in the pandemic. Methods: Cohort samples were selected from patients and HCP with PCR-positive SARS-CoV-2 infection from a period with complete retention of samples (March 14, 2021–April 10, 2020) at Rush University Medical Center, a 664-bed hospital in Chicago, Illinois. During this period, testing was limited to symptomatic patients and HCP. Recommended respiratory equipment for HCP evolved under guidance, including a 19-day period when medical face masks were recommended for COVID-19 care except for aerosol-generating procedures. Viral RNA was extracted and sequenced (NovaSeq, Illumina) from remnant nasopharyngeal swab samples in M4RT viral transport medium. Genomes with >90% coverage underwent cluster detection using a 2 single-nucleotide variant genetic distance cutoff. Genomic clusters were independently evaluated for valid epidemiologic links by 2 infectious diseases physicians (with a third adjudicator) using metadata extracted from the electronic medical record and according to predetermined criteria (Table 1). Results: In total, 1,031 SARS-CoV-2 sequences were analyzed, identifying 49 genomic clusters with HCP (median, 8; range, 2–43 members per cluster; total, 268 patients and 115 HCP) (Fig. 1). Also, 20,190 flowsheet activities were documented for cohort HCP and patient interactions, including 686 instances in which a cohort HCP contributed to a cohort patient’s chart. Most HCP infections were considered not healthcare associated (88 of 115, 76.5%). We did not identify any strong linkages for patient-to-HCP transmission. Moreover, 13 HCP cases (11.3%) were attributed to patient source (weak linkage). Also, 14 HCP cases (12.2%) were attributed to HCP source (11 strong and 3 weak linkages). Weak linkages were due to lack of epidemiologic data for HCP location, particularly nonclinical staff (eg, an environmental service worker who lacked location documentation to rule out patient-specific contact). Agreement for epidemiologic linkage between the 2 evaluators was high (κ, 0.91). Conclusions: Using genomic and epidemiologic data, we found that most HCP COVID-19 infections were not healthcare associated. We found weak evidence to support symptomatic patient-to-HCP transmission of SARS-CoV-2 and stronger evidence for HCP-to-HCP transmission. Large genomic clusters without plausible epidemiologic links were identified, reflecting the limited utility of genomic surveillance alone to characterize chains of transmission of SARS-CoV-2 during extensive community spread. Funding: None Disclosures: None
Author Sansom, Sarah
Lin, Michael
Baied, Elias
Fukuda, Christine
Moore, Nicholas
Kim, DO Young
Thotapalli, Lahari
Barbian, Hannah
Hayden, Mary
Snitkin, Evan
Author_xml – sequence: 1
  givenname: Sarah
  surname: Sansom
  fullname: Sansom, Sarah
– sequence: 2
  givenname: Hannah
  surname: Barbian
  fullname: Barbian, Hannah
– sequence: 3
  givenname: Evan
  surname: Snitkin
  fullname: Snitkin, Evan
– sequence: 4
  givenname: Christine
  surname: Fukuda
  fullname: Fukuda, Christine
– sequence: 5
  givenname: Nicholas
  surname: Moore
  fullname: Moore, Nicholas
– sequence: 6
  givenname: Lahari
  surname: Thotapalli
  fullname: Thotapalli, Lahari
– sequence: 7
  givenname: Elias
  surname: Baied
  fullname: Baied, Elias
– sequence: 8
  givenname: DO Young
  surname: Kim
  fullname: Kim, DO Young
– sequence: 9
  givenname: Mary
  surname: Hayden
  fullname: Hayden, Mary
– sequence: 10
  givenname: Michael
  surname: Lin
  fullname: Lin, Michael
BookMark eNpVkV1rFDEYhYNUsNbe-QMC3jrbfE0-boSy2FooCFbFu5DJvNnJMpusyWyh_960W4q9Sjg5eV7ec96jk5QTIPSRkhUlVF24Oq0YYWxFjX6DTpnirBNG_Dn57_4Onde6JYQwTYky6hTZa0h5Fz2O6R7qEjduiTnhJeM4QlpieMDLBLjmQ_GAc8B3lz_uunX-3bH2JYB_srtdThs8gZuXybsCeA-l5pRg_oDeBjdXOH8-z9Cvq68_19-62-_XN-vL284zJnRHpReKS6Fcz6VSIFkYuKdBGS6AK6FMAKqdoaFJKnDNxzAGPlIhXS9Hys_QzZE7Zre1-xJ3rjzY7KJ9EnLZWFeW6GewIggd1DBI7YnoAx0kk6anI9V9z42UjfXlyNofhh2MvuVQ3PwK-volxclu8r01kgqteAN8egaU_PfQYrXbll9q-1umekVVr4Vurs9Hly-51gLhZQIl9rFS2yq1j5XaVin_B8Rald8
ContentType Journal Article
Copyright The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Society for Healthcare Epidemiology of America. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ (the “License”). Notwithstanding the ProQuest Terms and Conditions, you may use this content in accordance with the terms of the License.
The Society for Healthcare Epidemiology of America 2022 2022 The Society for Healthcare Epidemiology of America
Copyright_xml – notice: The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Society for Healthcare Epidemiology of America. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ (the “License”). Notwithstanding the ProQuest Terms and Conditions, you may use this content in accordance with the terms of the License.
– notice: The Society for Healthcare Epidemiology of America 2022 2022 The Society for Healthcare Epidemiology of America
DBID AAYXX
CITATION
3V.
7RV
7X7
7XB
88C
8C1
8FI
8FJ
8FK
ABUWG
AFKRA
AZQEC
BENPR
CCPQU
COVID
DWQXO
FYUFA
GHDGH
K9.
KB0
M0S
M0T
NAPCQ
PIMPY
PQEST
PQQKQ
PQUKI
PRINS
5PM
DOA
DOI 10.1017/ash.2022.198
DatabaseName CrossRef
ProQuest Central (Corporate)
ProQuest Nursing and Allied Health Journals
ProQuest Health & Medical Collection
ProQuest Central (purchase pre-March 2016)
Healthcare Administration Database (Alumni)
Public Health Database (Proquest)
Hospital Premium Collection
Hospital Premium Collection (Alumni Edition)
ProQuest Central (Alumni) (purchase pre-March 2016)
ProQuest Central (Alumni)
ProQuest Central
ProQuest Central Essentials
AUTh Library subscriptions: ProQuest Central
ProQuest One Community College
Coronavirus Research Database
ProQuest Central
Health Research Premium Collection
Health Research Premium Collection (Alumni)
ProQuest Health & Medical Complete (Alumni)
Nursing & Allied Health Database (Alumni Edition)
Health & Medical Collection (Alumni Edition)
Health Management Database (Proquest)
Nursing & Allied Health Premium
Publicly Available Content Database
ProQuest One Academic Eastern Edition (DO NOT USE)
ProQuest One Academic
ProQuest One Academic UKI Edition
ProQuest Central China
PubMed Central (Full Participant titles)
DOAJ Directory of Open Access Journals
DatabaseTitle CrossRef
Publicly Available Content Database
ProQuest Central Essentials
ProQuest Health & Medical Complete (Alumni)
ProQuest Central (Alumni Edition)
ProQuest One Community College
ProQuest Central China
ProQuest Central
Health Research Premium Collection
Health and Medicine Complete (Alumni Edition)
ProQuest Central Korea
ProQuest Public Health
ProQuest One Academic Eastern Edition
ProQuest Health Management
Coronavirus Research Database
ProQuest Nursing & Allied Health Source
ProQuest Hospital Collection
Health Research Premium Collection (Alumni)
ProQuest Hospital Collection (Alumni)
Nursing & Allied Health Premium
ProQuest Health & Medical Complete
ProQuest One Academic UKI Edition
ProQuest Health Management (Alumni Edition)
ProQuest Nursing & Allied Health Source (Alumni)
ProQuest One Academic
ProQuest Central (Alumni)
DatabaseTitleList
Publicly Available Content Database

CrossRef
Database_xml – sequence: 1
  dbid: DOA
  name: Directory of Open Access Journals
  url: https://www.doaj.org/
  sourceTypes: Open Website
– sequence: 2
  dbid: BENPR
  name: AUTh Library subscriptions: ProQuest Central
  url: https://www.proquest.com/central
  sourceTypes: Aggregation Database
DeliveryMethod fulltext_linktorsrc
Discipline Public Health
EISSN 2732-494X
EndPage s75
ExternalDocumentID oai_doaj_org_article_4f48f7bb68c045f1b626951d18553966
10_1017_ash_2022_198
GroupedDBID 09C
09E
0R~
7RV
7X7
8C1
8FI
8FJ
AASVR
AAYXX
ABUWG
ABVZP
ADAZD
ADDNB
ADKIL
ADVJH
AEBAK
AEYHU
AFKRA
AGABE
AGJUD
AHIPN
AHRGI
ALIPV
ALMA_UNASSIGNED_HOLDINGS
AQJOH
BENPR
BLZWO
CCPQU
CCQAD
CITATION
CJCSC
FYUFA
GROUPED_DOAJ
HMCUK
IKXGN
IPYYG
M0T
M~E
NAPCQ
OK1
PGMZT
PIMPY
RCA
ROL
RPM
UKHRP
WFFJZ
3V.
7XB
8FK
AZQEC
COVID
DWQXO
K9.
PQEST
PQQKQ
PQUKI
PRINS
5PM
ID FETCH-LOGICAL-c2248-16c473647a53677e62fb3c1f7934e37479fe18a91ff797f383dfdf3d146a56d13
IEDL.DBID RPM
ISSN 2732-494X
IngestDate Fri Oct 04 13:12:32 EDT 2024
Tue Sep 17 21:31:04 EDT 2024
Thu Oct 10 22:55:02 EDT 2024
Fri Aug 23 02:05:47 EDT 2024
IsDoiOpenAccess true
IsOpenAccess true
IsPeerReviewed true
IsScholarly true
Issue S1
Language English
License This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
LinkModel DirectLink
MergedId FETCHMERGED-LOGICAL-c2248-16c473647a53677e62fb3c1f7934e37479fe18a91ff797f383dfdf3d146a56d13
OpenAccessLink https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9614873/
PQID 2757175848
PQPubID 5514775
ParticipantIDs doaj_primary_oai_doaj_org_article_4f48f7bb68c045f1b626951d18553966
pubmedcentral_primary_oai_pubmedcentral_nih_gov_9614873
proquest_journals_2757175848
crossref_primary_10_1017_ash_2022_198
PublicationCentury 2000
PublicationDate 20220701
PublicationDateYYYYMMDD 2022-07-01
PublicationDate_xml – month: 07
  year: 2022
  text: 20220701
  day: 01
PublicationDecade 2020
PublicationPlace Cambridge
PublicationPlace_xml – name: Cambridge
– name: New York, USA
PublicationTitle Antimicrobial stewardship & healthcare epidemiology : ASHE
PublicationYear 2022
Publisher Cambridge University Press
Publisher_xml – name: Cambridge University Press
SSID ssj0002810797
Score 2.24267
Snippet Background: Contact tracing alone is often inadequate to determine the source of healthcare personnel (HCP) COVID-19 when SARS-CoV-2 is widespread in the...
Background: Contact tracing alone is often inadequate to determine the source of healthcare personnel (HCP) COVID-19 when SARS-CoV-2 is widespread in the...
SourceID doaj
pubmedcentral
proquest
crossref
SourceType Open Website
Open Access Repository
Aggregation Database
StartPage s74
SubjectTerms Coronaviruses
COVID-19
Disease transmission
Genomics
Health care
Infections
Infectious diseases
Medical personnel
Pandemics
Patients
Poster Presentation - Oral Presentation
Public health
Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2
SummonAdditionalLinks – databaseName: DOAJ Directory of Open Access Journals
  dbid: DOA
  link: http://utb.summon.serialssolutions.com/2.0.0/link/0/eLvHCXMwrV3PT8MgFCbGk4kx_ozTaTjoEU2hLeU4F-diogfnzG4ECmQzpl3cPPjf-4BuricvXmkT6HuF932PxwdCVxZYslJlQlQpLEmpS4kqaEpYoZ1RZWYS5_MdT8_5cJw-TrLJxlVfviYsygNHw92mLi0c1zovSkAfLtGAwAEVGIgzGQOsHlbfJNsgU-8hZQS0RvCm0t1rRKuF33qg9AZYdisGBan-Fr5sV0duhJvBPtprcCLuxfEdoC1bHaLdmGTD8ezQEZIPNpwqxrNftYy6wssaz8L5W_eNAd_hmKDHtcOj3suI9Os3QvGqCqvC4b4hPF0XguF5QOGV_ThG48H9a39ImhsTSAmhGOhgXqbcK8KrjOWc25w6zUowt2CpZcAchLNJoUTioIk7YKfGGccMLJcqy03CTtB2VVf2FGEhqGNAvoyfsdwZDVAmYeAMoWlmOeug65UN5TwKY8hYMcYl2Fp6W0uwdQfdeQOv3_Fy1qEBnCwbJ8u_nNxB3ZV7ZDPHFpLyDLgoACjog7dc1uqs_aSaTYOGtvACqJyd_cfoztGO_9pYxNtF28vPL3sBUGWpL8Nf-QNxbebB
  priority: 102
  providerName: Directory of Open Access Journals
– databaseName: Coronavirus Research Database
  dbid: COVID
  link: http://utb.summon.serialssolutions.com/2.0.0/link/0/eLvHCXMwnV1Nb9QwEB3B9oKESikgthTkAz16Uewkjk9Vu6UUJEDql3qz_NmuqJJtd3sov55x4mwbDhy4OpETa-yZ98bjZ4CPHlmy1jaj2kpPcxZyqiuWU16Z4LQtXBZivuP7j_LoLP92UVykhNsilVX2PrF11K6xMUf-iYkCmQeGy2p3fkPjrVFxdzVdofEU1niFTGcEa9Of518PVlkWViG9kSJVvEetaL2IWxCMTZBtD2JRK9k_wJnDKslHYefwBaj-h7tqk1-Tu6WZ2N9_aTn-_4g2YD0hUrLXTaGX8MTXm_C8S-eR7pTSK1BffHt-mcwedDmamiwbMmtP-oZ7gkiSdFsBpAnkZO_4hE6bc8pIX-9Vk_ZmI3K1Kjkj8xbv1_76NZwdfj6dHtF0NwO1GPSReJY2F1F7Xhe8FMKXLBhu0bCS554jR5HBZ5WWWcAmEZAHu-ACd-iYdVG6jL-BUd3U_i0QKVngSPNc9A0iOIOgKeMhr6RhhRd8DDu9ldS8k-BQXW2aUGhNFa2p0Jpj2I8mXL0ThbPbhub2UqV1qHLsNwhjysoimA2ZQUKHINMhbCk4Ur8xbPfGUmk1L9SDpcYgBpNi8LHhk3p21ap1yyi1KvjWvzt-B8_iOLpC4G0YLW_v_HuEO0vzIc3pP6YxBAc
  priority: 102
  providerName: ProQuest
Title Genomic investigation to identify the source of SARS-CoV-2 infection among healthcare personnel
URI https://www.proquest.com/docview/2757175848
https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/PMC9614873
https://doaj.org/article/4f48f7bb68c045f1b626951d18553966
Volume 2
hasFullText 1
inHoldings 1
isFullTextHit
isPrint
link http://utb.summon.serialssolutions.com/2.0.0/link/0/eLvHCXMwnV1JT9wwFH5iuSBVVWlBnZaOfGiPmVHsJI6PkLJKLGLT3CyvMBUkI5ge-u_77CRArlwSyVmcPNvx97187xngp0OWrJRJE2WESzLqs0SVNEtYqb1VJrepD_6O07Pi6CY7meWzFcj7WJgo2jd6PqkfHif1_D5qKxePZtrrxKYXp5UI2Ss5m67CKmfsDUX_E71FyGgE70TuIT20eg5_HSidIMEeTD8xS_8AWg6FkW9mmoNP8LGDiGS3fZRNWHH1Z_jQ-tdIGzb0BeShiwHFZP6aKKOpybIh8xh66_8RhHak9c2TxpOr3curpGpuE0p6AVZN4lJD5P5FA0YWEYDX7mELbg72r6ujpFssITE4CyMTLEzGQzJ4lbOCc1dQr5lBSwuWOYakQXiXlkqkHou4R2JqvfXM4pdS5YVN2Tas1U3tvgIRgnqGvMuGwcq91YhiUuazUmiaO85G8Ku3oVy0OTFkKxbjEm0tg60l2noEe8HAL-eETNaxoHm6k117ygzv67nWRWkQXfpUI8NC1GcRR-QMudgIdvrmkd3wepaU50hDETthHXzQZIPKhkewN8X02V3v-fbuK7_DRnjFVrS7A2vLp7_uB0KTpR5jh5xx3JZVOob1vf2zi0vcV-e3x7_Hke6PY2f9Dzkc7K0
link.rule.ids 230,315,733,786,790,870,891,2115,12083,12250,21416,27955,27956,31752,33299,33777,38549,43343,43612,43838,43928,53825,53827,74100,74369,74657,74767
linkProvider National Library of Medicine
linkToHtml http://utb.summon.serialssolutions.com/2.0.0/link/0/eLvHCXMwfV1LT-MwEB4t5QASQiwPbaG7-ABHg2IncXxCFMGWV4V4iZvlxDZUWiWFlgP_fseJW8iFqxM5yvgx3zcefwOwZ5Ela11EVBfS0pi5mOqMxZRnuTO6SEzkfLzjepgOHuKLp-QpBNwmIa1ytifWG7WpCh8jP2QiQeaB7jI7Gr9SXzXKn66GEhoLsOglN7MOLPZPhze38ygLy5DeSBEy3r1WtJ74IwjGDpBtt3xRLdnfwpntLMkvbudsDVYDXiTHzQD_hB-2XIeVJthGmjtEG6D-2vp2MRl9qmZUJZlWZFTfw3UfBHEeaQL1pHLk7vj2jp5Uj5SRWTZWSeq6Q-RlnhBGxjUaL-2_TXg4O70_GdBQOYEW6JKRFqZFLLwyvE54KoRNmct5gWaXPLYcGYR0Nsq0jBw2CYemM844bnDb1ElqIr4FnbIq7S8gUjLHkYQZv3KFMzlCmoi7OJM5S6zgXdif2VCNG4EM1WSOCYW2Vt7WCm3dhb438PwdL2tdN1RvzyqsEhVjv07keZoVCDVdlCPdQghoEFQkHIlZF3qz4VFhrU3U58zogmgNWetj7Sfl6KXW0pZeCFXw7e873oWlwf31lbo6H17uwLL_pyZltwed6du7_Y3AZJr_CbPvP8DC4_E
linkToPdf http://utb.summon.serialssolutions.com/2.0.0/link/0/eLvHCXMwfV1LT9wwEB61IFWVqgr6EFug-NAeXRo7ieNTxWuhL1SVUu3NcmJPWalKFnY58O8ZO96lufTqRI4yfsz3jT_PALzzxJKtbTJuG-15LjDnthI5l1WNzjaFyzDEO76fl2eX-ZdJMUn6p3mSVS73xLhRu64JMfJ9oQpiHuQuq31Msogfx-NPs2seKkiFk9ZUTuMxrJOX_BjKOKiJWsVbREVER6ukfQ9Zo-08HEYI8YF498ArxeT9A8Q51Ev-44DGG_A8IUd20A_1Jjzy7Qt41ofdWH-b6CWYUx_vGbPpQ_6MrmWLjk3jjVy8Y4T4WB-yZx2yi4OfF_yo-80FW-qyWhYrELGrlTSMzSIub_3fV3A5Pvl1dMZTDQXekHMmglg2uQo54m0hS6V8KbCWDQ2AlrmXxCU0-qyyOkNqUkh81aFD6WgDtUXpMvka1tqu9VvAtBYoiY65sIYVuprATSYxr3QtCq_kCN4vbWhmfaoM02vIlCFbm2BrQ7YewWEw8OqdkOA6NnQ3f0xaLyanflHVdVk1BDoxq4l4ERh0BC8KSRRtBDvL4TFp1c3NwxwZgRoM2eBjwyft9Cpm1dYhJaqSb_7f8R48oWlnvn0-_7oNT8Mv9drdHVhb3Nz6XUIoi_ptnHr3N0nmrg
openUrl ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fsummon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Genomic+investigation+to+identify+the+source+of+SARS-CoV-2+infection+among+healthcare+personnel&rft.jtitle=Antimicrobial+stewardship+%26+healthcare+epidemiology+%3A+ASHE&rft.au=Sansom%2C+Sarah&rft.au=Barbian%2C+Hannah&rft.au=Snitkin%2C+Evan&rft.au=Fukuda%2C+Christine&rft.date=2022-07-01&rft.pub=Cambridge+University+Press&rft.eissn=2732-494X&rft.volume=2&rft.issue=Suppl+1&rft.spage=s74&rft.epage=s75&rft_id=info:doi/10.1017%2Fash.2022.198&rft.externalDBID=PMC9614873
thumbnail_l http://covers-cdn.summon.serialssolutions.com/index.aspx?isbn=/lc.gif&issn=2732-494X&client=summon
thumbnail_m http://covers-cdn.summon.serialssolutions.com/index.aspx?isbn=/mc.gif&issn=2732-494X&client=summon
thumbnail_s http://covers-cdn.summon.serialssolutions.com/index.aspx?isbn=/sc.gif&issn=2732-494X&client=summon