Open-source information and repression

• Published in: Journal of Comparative Economics
• Main Author: Oechslin, Manuel
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Elsevier Inc 01.08.2025
• Subjects: Hidden repression; Institutional safeguards; Open-source information; Reelection; Institutional safeguards; H11; Reelection; Open-source information; D72; D82; Hidden repression
• ISSN: 0147-5967
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jce.2025.07.006

With information-gathering devices like smartphones and drones proliferating, the likelihood that acts of government incompetence or wrongdoing leave relevant traces in the public domain steadily rises. The current paper proposes an applied game-theoretic model to explore how an incumbent politician with reelection concerns responds to this rise in open-source information. The analysis shows that an inherent aspect of the rise is a tendency towards heightened repression. In the model, if executive power is not sufficiently checked, the incumbent escalates hidden repression against free speech. Consequently, the electorate receives less, rather than more, information about the type of the incumbent – and the prospect of electoral defeat due to incompetence diminishes. The model’s predictions align with recent global trends in freedom of expression. The analysis stresses the rising importance of fortifying institutions that safeguard free speech and warns that international bodies like the European Union will be subject to growing centrifugal forces. •With more open-source info, chances rise that government faults leave public traces.•A game-theoretic model shows this rise boosts incumbents’ incentives to repress speech.•Weak checks on power let repression escalate, keeping voters less well informed.•Uneven checks in the EU may fuel centrifugal forces unless free-speech safeguards grow.