Privately held or publicly owned? Large shareholders and corporate control – evolutionary game theoretic analysis
I use evolutionary game theoretic techniques to model the interaction between managers and shareholders and describe the equilibrium ownership structure arrived at in different legal environments. The decision to go public and the shape of the ownership structure itself depend on the particular comb...
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| Published in | Corporate Ownership and Control Vol. 12; no. 4; pp. 141 - 155 |
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| Main Author | |
| Format | Journal Article |
| Language | English |
| Published |
2015
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| Online Access | Get full text |
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| Summary: | I use evolutionary game theoretic techniques to model the interaction between managers and shareholders and describe the equilibrium ownership structure arrived at in different legal environments. The decision to go public and the shape of the ownership structure itself depend on the particular combination of ownership that maximizes the initial owners’ wealth. Owners/managers and large shareholders exert costly efforts to increase their share of the value of the public firm. The respective shares and the listing decision are affected by the efficiency of the judiciary and law enforcement system |
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| ISSN: | 1727-9232 1810-3057 |
| DOI: | 10.22495/cocv12i4p10 |