Cooperative Exchange with Substitutable Ties and Its Competitive Outcomes

With a model of tie substitution, a construct that reflects each actor's evaluation of his or her social relations or networks, this study proposes that each actor's subjective evaluation of objective structural constraints may facilitate or delay the realization of structural constraints...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inSeoul Journal of Business Vol. 17; no. 2; pp. 61 - 95
Main Author 배종훈
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Seoul Seoul National University, College of Business Administration 01.12.2011
경영연구소
Subjects
Alliances
Capital markets
Competition
Cooperation
Economists
Efficiency
Institutionalism
Joint ventures
Social networks
Sociology
Studies
경영학
Online AccessGet full text
ISSN1226-9816
DOI10.35152/snusjb.2011.17.2.003

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Summary:With a model of tie substitution, a construct that reflects each actor's evaluation of his or her social relations or networks, this study proposes that each actor's subjective evaluation of objective structural constraints may facilitate or delay the realization of structural constraints in general and the division of cooperative benefits in particular. It shows the following: first, ego with few (perceived) substitutable ties is likely to accept the unequal allocation of cooperative benefits; second, symmetry in tiesubstitution at the global network suppresses (aggravates) competition for the division of cooperative outcomes when individual tie-substitution is low (high). [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-1
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
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G704-001894.2011.17.2.001
ISSN:1226-9816
DOI:10.35152/snusjb.2011.17.2.003