Fiscal Space and the Supply of Pro‐Government Militias

ABSTRACT Militias hamper state‐building by undermining the government's monopoly of violence, which creates an environment of anarchy. Yet many governments collaborate with them. These pro‐government militias (PGMs), such as paramilitary groups, are not only a poor‐country phenomenon, that is,...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published inJournal of public economic theory Vol. 26; no. 6
Main Author Lehmann, M. Christian
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Oxford Blackwell Publishing Ltd 01.12.2024
Subjects
Online AccessGet full text

Cover

Loading…
More Information
Summary:ABSTRACT Militias hamper state‐building by undermining the government's monopoly of violence, which creates an environment of anarchy. Yet many governments collaborate with them. These pro‐government militias (PGMs), such as paramilitary groups, are not only a poor‐country phenomenon, that is, economic growth does not seem to eradicate these armed nonstate actors: Intriguingly, cross‐country data reveals a U‐shaped relationship between GDP per capita and PGM presence. This article presents an economic theory of PGM supply that can explain this puzzling relationship and provide actionable ways for international actors (e.g., UN) to discourage the emergence of PGMs. However, the theory also cautions that some common international policies (e.g., development aid) may unintentionally encourage PGM supply.
ISSN:1097-3923
1467-9779
DOI:10.1111/jpet.70007