Design and Evaluation of a Power Analysis Resilient Implementation of Piccolo-80 Lightweight Encryption Algorithm

Piccolo is an ultra-lightweight encryption algorithm designed for highly resource-constrained platforms. However, lightweight algorithms are susceptible and vulnerable to side-channel attacks, including the powerful correlation power analysis (CPA) technique. This study highlights the vulnerability...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published inJournal of hardware and systems security Vol. 7; no. 4; pp. 101 - 109
Main Author Masoumi, M.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Cham Springer International Publishing 01.12.2023
Springer Nature B.V
Subjects
Algorithms
Boolean
Circuits and Systems
Computer Hardware
Cryptography
Data processing
Energy consumption
Engineering
Information Systems Applications (incl.Internet)
Lightweight
Systems and Data Security
FPGA implementation
Masking
Countermeasure techniques
Piccolo-80
Power analysis attacks
Online AccessGet full text

Cover

More Information
Summary:Piccolo is an ultra-lightweight encryption algorithm designed for highly resource-constrained platforms. However, lightweight algorithms are susceptible and vulnerable to side-channel attacks, including the powerful correlation power analysis (CPA) technique. This study highlights the vulnerability of Piccolo to CPA and propose an effective masking scheme to mitigate this threat. The conducted experiments demonstrate that CPA attack on unmasked implementations of Piccolo was successful, while the masked version of the algorithm proved resistant, preventing key recovery. Additionally, we have introduced a straightforward Boolean scheme for implementing the algorithm. These findings hold significant importance for the future of IoT devices and applications, where area, energy consumption, and security are critical considerations.
ISSN:2509-3428
2509-3436
DOI:10.1007/s41635-023-00136-0