Incentives to improve teaching Lessons from Latin America
Latin America faces tremendous challenges, particularly those of development, poverty, and inequality. Education is widely recognized as one of the most critical means of defeating these challenges. Democratizing education, by improving both its coverage and quality, is critical to overcoming the so...
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| Main Author | |
|---|---|
| Format | eBook Book |
| Language | English |
| Published |
Washington, DC
The World Bank
2005
World Bank Publications Washington, DC: World Bank |
| Edition | 1 |
| Series | Directions in development |
| Subjects | |
| Online Access | Get full text |
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Table of Contents:
- 4.14 SNED Relationship to Effectiveness
- 3.5 Productivity Log Wage Differential between Teachers and Different Samples of Nonteachers: Estimated Endowment Effect from the Oaxaca Decomposition -- 3.6 Conditional Log Wage Differential between Teachers and Different Samples of Nonteachers: Estimated Price Effect from the Oaxaca Decomposition -- 3.7 Contribution of the Difference in the Return to Schooling to the Conditional Log Wage Differential -- 3.8 Contribution of the Difference in the Returns to Potential Experience to the Conditional Log Wage Differential -- 3.9 Contribution of the Difference in Women's Wage Premiums to the Conditional Log Wage Differential -- 3.10 Contribution of the Difference in Rural Residence Wage Premium to the Conditional Log Wage Differential -- 3.11 Contribution of the Difference in Initial Wage to the Conditional Log Wage Differential -- 3.12 Conditional Log Wage Differential between Teachers and Nonteachers by Quantile of the Conditional Wage Distribution -- 4.1a Hourly Income Distribution of Teachers and All Nonteachers, 1998 -- 4.1b Hourly Income Distribution of Teachers and Nonteachers with 13 or More Years of Schooling, 1998 -- 4.1c Hourly Income Distribution of Teachers and Nonteachers with 17 or More Years of Schooling, 1998 -- 4.2a Hourly Income Distribution of Teachers and All Nonteachers, 2000 -- 4.2b Hourly Income Distribution of Teachers and Nonteachers with 13 or More Years of Schooling, 2000 -- 4.2c Hourly Income Distribution of Teachers and Nonteachers with 17 or More Years of Schooling, 2000 -- 4.3a Salary Differentials between Female Teachers and Nonteachers, 1998 -- 4.3b Salary Differentials between Male Teachers and Nonteachers, 1998 -- 4.4 Allowances and Monetary Incentives for Teachers, 2002/03 -- 4.5 Responses of Principals: "I Agree or Strongly Agree with MINEDUC Regularly Evaluating Schools Receiving State Subsidies"
- 9.1 Model of Effective Community School, With (Some) Testable Hypotheses -- Tables -- 3.1 Household Surveys -- 3.2 Occupational Codes Included in the Definition of Teachers -- 3.3 Size of Teachers' Sample -- 3.4 Alternative Definitions of Nonteachers -- 3.5. Unconditional Log Wage Differential between Teachers and Different Samples of Nonteachers: ln(GTN + 1) -- 3.6 Conditional Log Wage Differential between Teachers and Different Samples of Nonteachers: Estimated Price Effect from the Oaxaca Decomposition: E[ln(wT)\X] - E[ln(wN)\X] -- 3.7 Conditional Log Wage Differential between Teachers and Different Samples of Nonteachers: Estimated Price Effect from the Oaxaca Decomposition: ln(DTN + 1) -- 3.8 Productivity Log Wage Differential between Teachers and Different Samples of Nonteachers: Estimated Endowment Effect from the Oaxaca Decomposition: ln(QTN + 1) -- 3.9 Conditional Log Wage Differential between Teachers and Sample 1 of Nonteachers by Quantile -- 4.1 Monthly Real Salaries of Full-Time (44 Hours) Teachers -- 4.2 Comparison of Teachers' Salaries with the Average Wage and Professionals' Salaries -- 4.3 Comparison of Teachers' Starting Salary with the National Minimum Wage -- 4.4 International Comparisons of Teachers' Salaries, 2001 -- 4.5 Total Expenditures of the Ministry of Education, 1990-2001 -- 4.6 Average Score for Admission to Teaching Programs -- 4.7 Means and Standard Deviations of Selected Variables in a Comparison of Teachers and Nonteachers, 1998 and 2000 -- 4.8 Determinants of Labor Income, Teachers Compared with Nonteachers, 1998 -- 4.9 Factors Determining Labor Income, Teachers Compared with Nonteachers, 2000 -- 4.10 Breakdown of the Wage of an Average Municipal Sector Teacher, 2003 -- 4.11 SNED: Beneficiaries and Resources -- 4.12 Trends in SNED Award Amounts -- 4.13 SNED's Effect on Effectiveness
- Empirical Strategy -- Findings -- Conclusions and Policy Implications -- 6 Arbitrary Variation in Teacher Salaries -- An Analysis of Teacher Pay in Bolivia -- Introduction -- Data -- Teacher Pay in Bolivia -- What Does the Pay Scale Reward? -- The Flow of Teachers through the Salary Structure -- Arbitrary Variation in Teacher Salaries -- Conclusions -- 7 Teacher and Principal Incentives in Mexico -- Introduction -- The Carrera Magisterial Program -- Data -- Allocation of Promotions -- Empirical Strategy -- Results for Teachers -- Results for Principals -- Conclusions -- 8 Decentralization of Education, Teacher Behavior, and Outcomes -- The Case of El Salvador's EDUCO Program -- Introduction -- The Case of El Salvador's EDUCO Program -- Empirical Analysis of the EDUCO Program -- Conclusions -- 9 Teacher Effort and Schooling Outcomes in Rural Honduras -- Introduction -- Analytical Framework -- Results -- Conclusions -- 10 Teacher Incentives and Student Achievement in Nicaraguan Autonomous Schools -- Introduction -- Nicaraguan Context -- Nicaraguan Autonomy -- Methods -- Results -- Conclusions -- 11 Political Economy, Incentives, and Teachers' Unions -- Case Studies in Chile and Peru -- Background -- Case Study of Chile: Reforms Designed and Implemented, Effect Yet to Be Seen -- Case Study of Peru: Incentives Reforms Underdesigned, Unimplemented -- Toward a Conclusion: Unions, Incentives, and Educational Progress in Latin America -- Figures -- 1.1 Many Types of Teacher Incentives Exist -- 3.1 Unconditional Log Hourly Wage and Monthly Earnings Differential -- 3.2 Hours Worked Per Week -- 3.3 Unconditional Log Wage Differential between Teachers and Different Samples of Nonteachers -- 3.4 Conditional Log Wage Differential between Teachers and Different Samples of Nonteachers: Estimated Coefficient for the Teachers' Dummy
- Intro -- Contents -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- 1 Improving Teaching and Learning through Effective Incentives -- Lessons from Education Reforms in Latin America -- Introduction -- Why and How Do Incentives Matter? -- Incentives as a Broad and Complex Concept -- Teacher Effectiveness and Student Performance -- A Wide System Affecting Teaching and Learning -- Education Reforms, Teaching Quality, and Student Learning -- Review of Chapters -- Improving Teaching Quality and Student Learning through Incentives -- An Agenda for Further Research on Teacher Incentives -- 2 A Literature Review of Teacher Quality and Incentives -- Theory and Evidence -- Introduction -- Principal-Agent Theory: Description and Critiques -- Teacher Quality and Its Determinants -- Current Educational Investment and Policies and Their Embedded Incentives -- Merit Pay -- School Organization -- Political Economy of Reform -- Summary and Conclusions -- 3 Are Teachers Well Paid in Latin America and the Caribbean? -- Relative Wage and Structure of Returns of Teachers -- Introduction -- How Can We Determine If Teachers Are Well Paid? -- Are Teachers Well Paid? -- Conclusions -- 4 Teachers' Salary Structure and Incentives in Chile -- Introduction -- Who Are Chile's Teachers? -- How Teachers' Salaries Are Determined -- Changes in Teachers' Salaries -- Effect of Salary Trends on Individuals Applying to Study Education -- Analysis of Relative Teacher Pay -- Incentives Embedded within Teachers' Salary Structure -- Effect of the SNED on Schools' Academic Achievement: A Preliminary Evaluation -- Evaluating Performance and Incentives: Teachers' and Principals' Perceptions -- Conclusions -- 5 Educational Finance Equalization, Spending, Teacher Quality, and Student Outcomes -- The Case of Brazil's FUNDEF -- Introduction -- Background on Brazil's Education System and FUNDEF -- Data
- 4.6 Responses of Principals: "I Agree or Strongly Agree That MINEDUC Should Provide Resources for Regularly Rewarding the Best Performing Schools" -- 4.7 Responses of Principals: "It Is 'Very Useful,' 'Somewhat Useful,' 'Useful' to Principal's Work That There Is a Monetary Award to Teachers, Associated with School Performance, Financed and Designed to MINEDUC Standards" -- 5.1 Evolution of Enrollment in Basic Education, by Level and Region, 1996-2002: EF1 -- 5.2 Evolution of Enrollment in Basic Education, by Level and Region, 1996-2002: EF2 -- 5.3 Gross Primary Enrollment Rates by Region, 1994-2000 -- 5.4 Net Primary Enrollment Rates by Region, 1994-2000 -- 5.5 Percentage of Qualified Teachers by Region, 1996-2002 -- 6.1 Salary Progression for Urban Teachers of All Training Levels -- 6.2 Distributions of Salaries for Urban and Rural Teachers -- 6.3 GIS Data for Santa Cruz Schools -- 7.1 Fitted Values of Promotion on Final Points, by Year, for Teachers -- 7.2 Fitted Values of Promotion on Final Points, by Year, for Principals -- 7.3 Stylized Portrayal of Empirical Strategy -- 7.4 Fitted Values of Classroom Test Scores on Initial Points, by Bandwidth for Teachers -- 7.5 Kernel Densities of Test Score for Teachers -- 7.6 Fitted Values of Classroom Test Scores on Initial Points, by Bandwidth and State, for Teachers -- 7.7 Test Scores and Pupil-Teacher Ratios in Year 10 for Teachers -- 7.8 Fitted Values of Classroom Test Scores on Initial Points, by Bandwidth for Principals -- 7.9 Fitted Values of Classroom Test Scores on Initial Points, by Bandwidth and State -- 8.1 Comparison of EDUCO and Traditional Governance Structures -- 8.2 OLS Estimated Coefficients on the EDUCO Variable for Major Influence Level of Key Administrative Processes -- 8.3 Estimated Coefficients for EDUCO Perceived Amount of Influence Compared with Traditional Schools