Representation in Cognitive Science

"Our thoughts are meaningful. We think about things in the outside world; how can that be so? This is one of the deepest questions in contemporary philosophy. Ever since the 'cognitive revolution', states with meaning-mental representations-have been the key explanatory construct of t...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author Shea, Nicholas
Format eBook
LanguageEnglish
Published Oxford, UK Oxford University Press 2018
Oxford University Press, Incorporated
Edition1
Subjects
Online AccessGet full text

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Table of Contents:
  • Intro -- Halftitle page -- Title page -- Copyright page -- Dedication page -- Epigraph -- Preface -- Contents -- Part I -- 1. Introduction -- 1.1 A Foundational Question -- 1.2 Homing In on the Problem -- 1.3 Existing Approaches -- 1.4 Teleosemantics -- 1.5 Challenges to Teleosemantics -- 2. Framework -- 2.1 Setting Aside Some Harder Cases -- 2.2 What Should Constrain Our Theorizing? -- 2.3 Externalist Explanandum, Externalist Explanans -- 2.4 Representation Without a Homunculus -- 2.5 What Vehicle Realism Buys -- 2.6 Pluralism: Varitel Semantics -- Part II -- 3. Functions for Representation -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 A Natural Cluster Underpins a Proprietary Explanatory Role -- 3.3 Robust Outcome Functions -- 3.4 Stabilized Functions: Three Types -- 3.5 Task Functions -- 3.6 How Task Functions Get Explanatory Purchase -- 3.7 Rival Accounts -- 3.8 Conclusion -- 4. Correlational Information -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Unmediated Explanatory Information -- 4.3 Feedforward Hierarchical Processing -- 4.4 Taxonomy of Cases -- 4.5 One Vehicle for Two Purposes -- 4.6 Representations Processed Differently in Different Contexts -- 4.7 One Representation Processed via Two Routes -- 4.8 Feedback and Cycles -- 4.9 Conclusion -- 5. Structural Correspondence -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 The Cognitive Map in the Rat Hippocampus -- 5.3 Preliminary Definitions -- 5.4 Content-Constituting Structural Correspondence -- 5.5 Unexploited Structural Correspondence -- 5.6 Two More Cases of UE Structural Correspondence -- 5.7 Some Further Issues -- 5.8 Conclusion -- Part III -- 6. Standard Objections -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 Indeterminacy -- 6.3 Compositionality and Non-Conceptual Representation -- 6.4 Objection to Relying on (Historical) Functions -- 6.5 Norms of Representation and of Function -- 6.6 Conclusion -- 7. Descriptive and Directive Representation
  • 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 An Account of the Distinction -- 7.3 Application to Case Studies -- 7.4 Comparison to Existing Accounts -- 7.5 Further Sophistication -- 7.6 Conclusion -- 8. How Content Explains -- 8.1 Introduction -- 8.2 How Content Explains -- 8.3 Causal Efficacy of Semantic Properties -- 8.4 Why Require Exploitable Relations? -- 8.5 Ambit of Varitel Semantics -- 8.6 Development and Content -- 8.7 Miscellaneous Qualifications -- 8.8 How to Find Out What Is Represented -- 8.9 Differences at the Personal Level -- Paragraph-by-Paragraph Summary -- Part I -- Part II -- Part III -- Acknowledgements -- Figure Credits -- References -- Index