Provably CCA-Secure Anonymous Multi-Receiver Certificateless Authenticated Encryption

• Published in: Journal of Information Science and Engineering Vol. 34; no. 6; pp. 1517 - 1541
• Main Authors: 曾一凡(YI-FAN TSENG), 范俊逸(CHUN-I FAN)
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Taipei 社團法人中華民國計算語言學學會 01.11.2018; Institute of Information Science, Academia Sinica
• Subjects: Algorithms; Authentication; Conferencing systems; Distance learning; Encryption; Islam; Privacy; Receivers; Security; Videoconferencing; anonymity; multi-receiver encryption; sender authentication; chosen-ciphertext attacks; certificate-less encryption
• ISSN: 1016-2364
• DOI: 10.6688/JISE.201811_34(6).0009

Multi-receiver encryption allows a sender to choose a set of authorized receivers and send them a message securely and efficiently. Only one ciphertext corresponding to the message is generated regardless of the number of receivers. Thus it is practical and useful for video conferencing systems, pay-per-view channels, distance education, and so forth. In 2010, for further protecting receivers' privacy, anonymous multi-receiver identity- based (ID-based) encryption was first discussed, and from then on, many works on the topic have been presented so far. To deal with the key escrow problem inherited from ID-based encryption (IBE), Islam et al. proposed the first anonymous multi-receiver certificateless encryption (AMRCLE) in 2014. In 2015, Hung et al. proposed a novel AMRCLE to improve the efficiency. However, we found that their security proofs are flawed, i.e., the simulation cannot be successfully performed. In this paper, we present a novel AMRCLE scheme with CCA security in confidentiality and anonymity against both Type I and Type II adversaries. Moreover, the identity of the sender of a ciphertext can be authenticated by the receiver after a successful decryption. To the best of our knowledge, the proposed scheme is the first CCA secure AMRCLE scheme, and furthermore, we also pioneer in achieving sender authentication in AMRCLE.